Économie administrée, corruption et engrenage de la violence en Algérie

Fatiha Talahite

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Abstract: Administrated economy, corruption and the build up of violence en Algeria. After a critical examination of theories which attribute corruption to oil revenues and to the rental functioning of the economy or of the State, or to the neo-patrimonial nature of power, the author prefers to focus the analysis on the administrated economy. She shows how colonization and, later, the socialist option caused a large disorder in property rights, making corruption an elusive and expansive phenomenon. The reforms engaged since the mid 80s and aimed at liberalization have proven ineffective since the legal framework of transactions is neither clearly defined nor protected by law. But this comes up against a conflict which stakes is the legitimacy of the institutions and of the legal system prevailing in Algeria.

Keywords: Algérie; économie; corruption; réforme; transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-03-31
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Published in Revue Tiers Monde, 2000, 41 (161), pp.49-74. ⟨10.3406/tiers.2000.1050⟩

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Journal Article: Économie administrée, corruption et engrenage de la violence en Algérie (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00655727

DOI: 10.3406/tiers.2000.1050

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