Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game

Raïsa-Juvette Samba Zitou and Rhonya Adli
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Raïsa-Juvette Samba Zitou: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Rhonya Adli: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: There is a great deal of literature on matching, theoretical, and empirical, concerning stable assignments and mechanisms that achieve them. The starting point of this study is an interesting question about assignment procedures: given a situation where some agents (the senior workers) on one side have a priority status, which changes the classical theory. The core of game may not be stable.We prove the existence of a quasi stable constrained core. This constrained core may not be a lattice but it is a finite and disjoint union of complete lattices that check the properties of the core's classical assignment game. We study the manipulability questions that derive.

Keywords: Assignment game; seniority constraint; quasi stable constrained core; union of lattices; manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Published in Theory and Decision, 2012, 72 (3), pp.323-340. ⟨10.1007/s11238-011-9288-x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00658506

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-011-9288-x

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