Directed networks with spillovers

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard () and Sudipta Sarangi
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Christophe Bravard: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We study noncooperative network formation in two types of directed networks. In the first type, called the model with global spillovers, the payoff of a player depends on the number of links she forms as well as the total number of links formed by all other players. In the second type, called the model with local spillovers, the payoff of a player depends on the number of links she forms and the total number of links formed by her immediate neighbors, as well as the number of links formed by players outside her neighborhood. For both classes of games we investigate the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria and characterize the Nash networks under a number of different second order conditions on the payoff function.

Keywords: Networks; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2012, 14 (6), pp.849-878. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12000⟩

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Journal Article: Directed Networks with Spillovers (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00667684

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12000

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