The strategy structure of some coalition formation games

Gabrielle Demange

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared. The predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form, as the collection of pairs of buyer-seller in an assignment game. The incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection. Furthermore the relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn.

Keywords: coalition formation; assignment; manipulability; substitutes; incremental value; Vickrey- Clarke-Groves mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 65 (1), pp.83-104

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The strategy structure of some coalition formation games (2009)
Working Paper: The strategy structure of some coalition formation games (2009)
Working Paper: The strategy structure of some coalition formation games (2006)
Working Paper: The strategy structure of some coalition formation games (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670881

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().