EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Universally Balanced Combinatorial Optimization Games

Gabrielle Demange and Xiaotie Deng
Additional contact information
Xiaotie Deng: Department of Computer Science [Hong Kong] - CUHK - City University of Hong Kong [Hong Kong]

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This article surveys studies on universally balanced properties of cooperative games defined in a succinct form. In particular, we focus on combinatorial optimization games in which the values to coalitions are defined through linear optimization programs, possibly combinatorial, that is subject to integer constraints. In economic settings, the integer requirement reflects some forms of indivisibility. We are interested in the classes of games that guarantee a non-empty core no matter what are the admissible values assigned to the parameters defining these programs. We call such classes universally balanced. We present characterization and complexity results on the universally balancedness property for some classes of interesting combinatorial optimization games. In particular, we focus on the algorithmic properties for identifying universally balancedness for the games under discussion.

Keywords: combinatorial cooperative games; balanced; blocking; core; integrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Games, 2010, 1 (3), pp.299-316

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Universally Balanced Combinatorial Optimization Games (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Universally Balanced Combinatorial Optimization Games (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670891

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670891