Incentives in some coalition formation games

Gabrielle Demange

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of benefits to coordinated activities has been studied extensively. Basic to the concept of the core is the idea of group rationality as embodied by the blocking condition. The predictions given by the core may run into difficulties if some individuals or coalitions may benefit from not blocking truthfully. This paper investigates this question in games in some games that generalize assignment games. Some positive results are given, and relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn.

Keywords: Rationality; Modeling; Coalition; Blocking; Coordination; Sharing; Formation; Incentive; Internet (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2005, pp.258-268

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670898

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().