Private Information and the Design of Securities

Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque

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Abstract: The privileged information that the owners have on their firms may discourage rational financial investors and consequently may prevent the entrepreneurs from floating their company on the market. The paper studies the validity of this argument in a model similar to that of Grossman and Stiglitz [8]: an entrepreneur who contemplates issuing a new security faces a trade-off between speculative gains, which arise from his privileged information, and an insurance motive, associated with the insurance provided by the stock market. We make explicit how this trade-off depends on the fundamentals of the economy: aggregate risk, risk tolerance, precision of the privileged information.

Keywords: Private Information; aggregate risk; risk tolerance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, 65 (1), pp.233-257

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Related works:
Journal Article: Private Information and the Design of Securities (1995)
Working Paper: Private Information and the Design of Securities (1993)
Working Paper: Private Information and the Design of Securities (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670911

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