Intermediate Preferences and Stable Coalition Structures

Gabrielle Demange

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Abstract: This paper models two forces that are at work to explain the formation of coalitions: The increasing power of the coalitions which incites to cooperate, the heterogeneity of the agents which leads to the formation of subgroups. We show that the interaction of these two forces results, under an intermediate preferences assumption, in the formation of coalitions that partition the society in a stable way.

Keywords: Intermediate preferences; Coalition structures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (113)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1994, 23 (1), pp.45-48

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Related works:
Journal Article: Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures (1994)
Working Paper: Intermediate Preferences and Stable Coalition Structures (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670920

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