A Further Note on the Stable Matching Problem

Gabrielle Demange, David Gale and Marilda Sotomayor ()
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David Gale: Department of Economics [Berkeley] - UC Berkeley - University of California [Berkeley] - UC - University of California

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Abstract: Using a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is shown that the core of the matching game is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is derived.

Keywords: non-manipulable; core; matching game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics, 1987, 16 (3), pp.217-222

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670980

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