The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets

Gabrielle Demange and David Gale
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David Gale: Department of Economics [Berkeley] - UC Berkeley - University of California [Berkeley] - UC - University of California

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Abstract: We study two-sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women. The agents are to form partnerships (which provide them with satisfaction) and at the same time make monetary transfers (e.g. salaries or dowries). The core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability.

Keywords: Intrahousehold allocation; Intergenerational transfers; Marriage market; Inheritance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985-07
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Published in Econometrica, 1985, 53 (4), pp.873-888

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670994

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