Single-peaked orders on a tree

Gabrielle Demange

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Abstract: Inada (1969) and Sen and Pattanaik (1969) have characterized the sets of preference orders which ensure the transitivity of the strict majority rule, no matter how each voter selects his own order in the set. But a problem remains untouched: which domains of orders guarantee the existence of a majority winner without necessarily ensuring the transitivity of the strict majority rule. We provide in this paper domains, called sets of single-peaked linear orders on a tree, which enjoy such a property. They appear as a generalization of the well-known sets of single-peaked linear orders.

Keywords: Single-peaked; preferences; majority rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1982-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (78)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982, 3 (4), pp.389-396

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