Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability and Policy Implications

Bruno Versaevel

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Keywords: Optimal Collusion; Limited Liability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06-27
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Published in SAET conference (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory), Faro (Portugal), 27 juin 2011, Jun 2011, Faro, Portugal

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