Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions

Ahmet Ozkardas () and Agnieszka Rusinowska
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Ahmet Ozkardas: Turgut Özal Üniversitesi - Iktisadi ve Idari Bilimler Fakültesi, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by sequences of discount factors varying in time. We determine subgame perfect equilibria for three cases when the strike decision of the union is exogenous : the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement, the case when the union is committed to go on strike only when its own offer is rejected, and the case when the union is supposed to go never on strike.

Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium; Union; firm bargaining; strike; alternating offers; varying discount rates; subgame perfect equilibrium.; Négociation entre un syndicat et une firme; grève; offres alternantes; taux d'escompte variable; équilibre en sous-jeu parfait. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00674033v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in 2012

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Working Paper: Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions (2012)
Working Paper: Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions (2012)
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