Downstream Competition, Foreclosure and Vertical Integration

Gilles Chemla () and Gilles Chemla
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Gilles Chemla: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper shows that dominant firms may wish to encourage competition in vertically-related markets. It shows that firms' incentives to vertically integrate other firms depends on the competitive environment.

Keywords: competition; forclosure; vertical integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00679847v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2003, 12 (2), pp.261-289

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00679847

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