A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Existence in Discontinuous Strategic Games

Philippe Bich () and Rida Laraki ()
Additional contact information
Philippe Bich: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Rida Laraki: X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, IMJ - Institut de Mathématiques de Jussieu - UPMC - Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 - UPD7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Several relaxations of Nash equilibrium are shown to exist in strategic games with discontinuous payoff functions. Those relaxations are used to extend and unify several recent results and link Reny's better-reply security condition [Reny, P.J. (1999). On the existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games] to Simon-Zame's endogenous tie-breaking rules [Simon, L.K. and Zame, W.R. (1990). Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules].

Keywords: symmetric games; Discontinuous games; Nash equilibrium; Reny equilibrium; better-reply security; endogenous sharing rule; quasi equilibrium; finite deviation equilibrium; Jeux discontinus; équilibre de Nash; équilibre de Reny; jeux better-reply secure; règle de partage endogène; quasi-équilibre; jeux symétriques (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00717135v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in 2012

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00717135v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00717135

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().