A note on local spillovers, convexity, and the strategic substitutes property in networks

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard () and Sudipta Sarangi
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Christophe Bravard: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks.

Keywords: Networks; Existence; Spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Theory and Decision, 2013, 75 (2), pp.293-304. ⟨10.1007/s11238-012-9328-1⟩

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Journal Article: A note on local spillovers, convexity, and the strategic substitutes property in networks (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00728199

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9328-1

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