Endogenous mergers and maximal concentration: a note

Emilie Dargaud

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Abstract: This article examines the incentive to merge in a Bertrand competition model with generalized substitutability and price competition. The model suggests that acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in maximal concentration of the industry.

Keywords: endogenous mergers; concentration; price competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2012, 32 (1), pp.137-146

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00733349

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