Inequality decomposition values: the trade-off between marginality and efficiency

Frédéric Chantreuil and Alain Trannoy

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Abstract: This paper presents a general procedure for decomposing income inequality measures by income sources. The methods of decomposition proposed are based on the Shapley value and extensions of the Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games. In particular, we find that Owen's value can find an interesting application in this context.We show that the axiomatization by the potential of Hart and Mas-Colell remains valid in the presence of the domain restriction of inequality indices. We also examine the properties of these decomposition rules and perform a comparison with Shorrocks' decomposition rule properties.

Keywords: Income sources; Shapley value; Inequality; Decomposition rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

Published in The Journal of Economic Inequality, 2013, 11 (1), pp.83-98. ⟨10.1007/s10888-011-9207-y⟩

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Journal Article: Inequality decomposition values: the trade-off between marginality and efficiency (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00733401

DOI: 10.1007/s10888-011-9207-y

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