Credit relationships: evidence from experiments with real bankers
David Masclet and
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Gervais Thenet: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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We experimentally examine to what extent long-term "lender-borrower" relationships mitigate moral hazard. The originality of our research lies in recruiting not only students but also commercial and social bankers. The opportunity to engage in bilateral long-term relationships mitigates the repayment problem. Lenders take advantage of their long-term situation by increasing their rates. Consequently, borrowers are incited to take more risk. Improving information disclosure ameliorates the repayment but does not incite lenders to offer more credits. Social bankers exhibit a higher probability of granting a loan and make fairer credit offers to borrowers than the other subject pools do.
Keywords: experimental economics; credit market; relationship lending; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Wiley, 2012, 44 (5), pp.957-980. 〈10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00517.x/pdf〉
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Journal Article: Credit Relationships: Evidence from Experiments with Real Bankers (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00738118
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