Undesired side effect? The promotion of non-commitment in formal vs. informal mentorships
Olivier Herrbach () and
Karim Mignonac ()
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Olivier Herrbach: CRM - Centre de Recherche en Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Karim Mignonac: CRM - Centre de Recherche en Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
This article deals with the 'promotion of non-commitment' from mentor to protege, that is the process by which mentors may provide their proteges with a discourse encouraging them to distance themselves from their organizations rather than commit themselves to them. It is based on two surveys of managerial-level employees, one using a mentor sample and the other one using a protege sample. Results of the first study indicated that mentor promotion of non-commitment was negatively related to mentor affective organizational commitment. The second study showed that the mentor promotion of non-commitment was negatively related to protege affective organisational commitment. However, this relationship was weaker in the case of formal mentorships than in that of informal mentorships
Keywords: "dysfunctional mentoring"; "mentoring"; dysfunctional mentoring; mentoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Published in International Journal of Human Resource Management, 2011, 22 (7), pp.1554-1569. ⟨10.1080/09585192.2011.561965⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00738198
DOI: 10.1080/09585192.2011.561965
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