Institutionnalisation des régimes de gouvernance et rôle des institutions socles: le cas de la cogestion allemande

Pierre-Yves Gomez () and Peter Wirtz
Additional contact information
Pierre-Yves Gomez: EM - EMLyon Business School

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Codetermined supervisory boards with half of the directors representing employees are one of the distinctive features of the German corporate governance system. This is often supposed to be rooted in typically "German culture". The present contribution reveals however that this supposedly "German tradition" is a myth. The specific regime of codetermined supervisory boards is rather the outcome of the dramatic political and institutional circumstances of the late nineteen-forties, having witnessed a fierce fight and the mobilization of various actors ranging from politicians and industrialists to trade unionists. On the way to an institutional consensus, the German catholic church played a significant, albeit seldom recognized, role. It acted as a "base institution" positively influencing the efforts of mobilization in favor of board codetermination and making an agreement possible.

Keywords: cogestion; mobilisation; institution socle; église catholique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Economies & Sociétés, 2008, K (19), pp.1869-1900

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Institutionnalisation des régimes de gouvernance et rôle des institutions socles:le cas de la cogestion allemande (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00746276

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().