Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale

Pierre Pestieau, Helmuth Cremer and Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would be no such implicit taxation. This raises the question of whether a bias in the benefit formula in favor of early retirement is necessarily the sign of a bad policy. We show that this implicit tax on potsponed retirement can be due to the desire by public authorities of using social security for redistribution when non-distortionary tools are not available. We also examine possible ways to mitigate these distorsions, for instance, through disability testing.

Keywords: Retirement age; Disability insurance; Disability testing; Retraite; Invalidité; Audit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2005, 115 (2), pp.197-211

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale (2005)
Working Paper: Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale (2005)
Working Paper: Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754098

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().