p-Best response set

Olivier Tercieux

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Abstract: This paper introduces a notion of p-best response set (p-BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p-best response set (p-MBR). After proving general existence results of the p-MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson revision opportunities borrowed from Matsui and Matsuyama [An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415-434.] Then, we study equilibrium selection. In particular, using our notion of p-BR, we generalize Morris et al. [p-Dominance and belief potential, Econometrica 63 (1995) 145-157.] that aimed to provide sufficient conditions under which a unique equilibrium is selected in the presence of higher order uncertainty.

Keywords: Set-valued concept; p-dominance; Risk-dominance; Perfect foresight dynamics; Higher-order uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2006, 131 (1), pp.45-70. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754120

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001

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