From harm to competitorsto harm to competition: one more effort, please !

David Spector

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Abstract: The rules proposed in the Commission's recently issued discussion paper on Article 82 are not always consistent with the purported objective of protecting competition rather than competitors. Unlike those for predatory pricing, bundling and tying, the proposed rule for single-branding and rebates implicitly relies on the assumption that harm to competitors implies harm to competition. But this should be checked rather than postulated. The causal link between harm to competitors and harm to competition chiefly depends on whether the dominant firm's competitors, facing a decrease in demand, are likely to react by cutting prices or by cutting investment. A proper assessment method should thus include an examination of the cost structure of the allegedly excluded firms, considering a possibly broader market than the relevant antitrust market. This would in some cases permit the quick dismissal of complaints without merits and thereby simplify enforcement.

Date: 2006-07
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Published in European Competition Journal, 2006, 18 (82 EC), pp.145-162. ⟨10.5235/ecj.v2n1s.145⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754145

DOI: 10.5235/ecj.v2n1s.145

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