Bundling, tying, and collusion

David Spector

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in a collusive oligopolistic market.

Keywords: Bundling; Tying; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25 (3), pp.575-581. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.06.003⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Bundling, tying, and collusion (2007)
Working Paper: Bundling, tying, and collusion (2007)
Working Paper: Bundling, tying and collusion (2006)
Working Paper: Bundling, tying and collusion (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754225

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.06.003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().