Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime
Thierry Verdier () and
Additional contact information
Yves Zenouc: CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR, GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Le Mans Université, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics - The Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Post-Print from HAL
This paper analyzes the interplay between social structure and information exchange in two competing activities, crime and labor. We consider a dynamic model in which individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. There are multiple equilibria. If jobs are badly paid and/or crime is profitable, unemployment benefits have to be low enough to prevent workers for staying too long in the unemployment status because they are vulnerable to crime activities. If, instead, jobs are well paid and/or crime is not profitable, unemployment benefits have to be high enough to induce workers to stay unemployed rather to commit crime because they are less vulnerable to crime activities. Also, in segregated neighborhoods characterized by high interactions between peers, a policy only based on punishment and arrest will not be efficient in reducing crime. It has to be accompanied by other types of policies that take into account social interactions.
Keywords: Social interactions; Crime; Labor market; Forward-looking agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754247
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, 2007, 91 (1-2), pp.203-233. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.05.011⟩
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Journal Article: Strong and weak ties in employment and crime (2007)
Working Paper: Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime (2006)
Working Paper: Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754247
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().