Addressing buyer power in merger control

David Spector

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Abstract: While competition authorities often take countervailing buyer power into account when assessing the competitive impact of a merger between sellers, they have so far been more reluctant to consider positively the creation or strengthening of buyer power resulting from a merger. This paper summarises the main economic mechanisms underlying the existence of market power, distinguishing between anonymous market interfaces and markets characterized by bilateral bargaining. It then draws implications for merger control, considering both buyer mergers and seller mergers.

Date: 2008-09
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Published in Concurrences [Competition law journal / Revue des droits de la concurrence], 2008, 3-2008 (20371), pp.34-39

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Working Paper: Addressing buyer power in merger control (2008)
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