Forced saving, redistribution and non linear social security scheme

Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Darío Maldonado and Pierre Pestieau

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save "enough" for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types. We show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics: Paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects. Numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving, and the desirability of social security increases.

Date: 2009-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://pjse.hal.science/halshs-00754346v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Southern Economic Journal, 2009, 76 (1), pp.86-98. ⟨10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.86⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://pjse.hal.science/halshs-00754346v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Forced Saving, Redistribution, and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes (2009)
Working Paper: Forced saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes (2009)
Working Paper: Forced saving, redistribution and non linear social security scheme (2009)
Working Paper: Forced Saving, Redistribution and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes (2008)
Working Paper: Forced saving, redistribution and nonlinear social security schemes (2008)
Working Paper: Forced Saving, Redistribution and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754346

DOI: 10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.86

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().