Effect of imperfect competition on infrastructure charges

David Meunier () and Emile Quinet
Additional contact information
David Meunier: LVMT - Laboratoire Ville, Mobilité, Transport - IFSTTAR - Institut Français des Sciences et Technologies des Transports, de l'Aménagement et des Réseaux - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées
Emile Quinet: PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The text explores the optimal infrastructure charges of an unbundled activity where the infrastructure manager sells the use of the infrastructure to operators providing services to a downstream market made up of atomistic customers. This situation has been widely analysed under the assumption that the upstream market is competitive, but more rarely in the case of imperfect competition. Typical examples are the railways activity in Europe and air transport. Various market structures are considered, illustrated by situations encountered in the transport field: a single mode operated by a single operator, two operators competing within the same mode, and two modes competing in a Bertrand way. In each case, situations are analysed using analytic formulae with a simplified demand function and a simplified cost function, and performing simulations with sensible parameter values drawn from current average situations. The main result is that the analysed imperfections make a dramatic departure from the conventional Marginal Cost pricing doctrine. Conclusions are drawn regarding infrastructure charging policy.

Keywords: Imperfect competition; Transport infrastructure; Rail High speed train; Lerner index; Pricing behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, 2009, 43 (dec 2009), pp.113-136

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754407

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().