Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]

Laurent Lamy

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Abstract: We find an error in [H. Cai, J. Riley, L. Ye, Reserve price signaling, J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]. The existence of the separating signaling equilibrium is not challenged, but the related comparative statics, while valid in the case without informational externalities between bidders, do not generalize to the case with informational externalities as claimed by the authors. General results on the influence of the number of bidders are obtained in a linear specification of the informational externalities.

Keywords: Auctions; Reserve price; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 145 (6), pp.2498-2504. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.009⟩

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Journal Article: Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] (2010)
Working Paper: Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754414

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.009

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