Bargaining and Majority Rules: A collective search Perspective

Olivier Compte and Philippe Jehiel ()
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Olivier Compte: PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We study collective search processes in, which members of a committee decide whether to accept the current proposal or continue searching. The acceptance decision is made according to majority rule. We study which members have more impact on the decision, as well as the degree of randomness of the decision. When proposals vary along a single dimension, the accpetance set is small, and at most two members determine the outcome whatever the majority rule. When proposals vary along many dimensions, the acceptance set is large except under unaminity and all members affect the distribution of decisions. Various implications are drawn.

Date: 2010-04
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Published in Journal of Political Economy, 2010, 118 (2), pp.189-221. ⟨10.1086/653093⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective (2010)
Working Paper: Bargaining and Majority Rules: A collective search Perspective (2010)
Working Paper: Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754459

DOI: 10.1086/653093

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