Economic analysis of remedies in competition law

Jacques-Philippe Gunther, David Spector and Thibaud Vergé
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Jacques-Philippe Gunther: Willkie Farr Gallagher - Willkie Farr Gallagher
Thibaud Vergé: Competition Authority - Competition Authority

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Abstract: This set of three papers is derived from the training session on the commitments organized by Concurrences Review that has held on 10th May 2011 in Paris. Commitments for both mergers and unilateral practices represent what may be considered a bright outcome, from the perspective of undertakings as well as competition authorities. To be implemented, commitments go through procedures and abide by principles, which have been experienced in practice and as a result polished. Many cases are nowadays settled or authorized through commitments, either structural or based on future behavior, which as a matter of fact tend to be combined. The frequent use of commitments makes their array as diverse as sophisticated while the traditional difference between, on the one hand structural remedies tailored for mergers and, on the other hand, behavioral commitments assumed more adapted for unilateral practices, seems to fade away.

Date: 2011-09
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Published in Concurrences [Competition law journal / Revue des droits de la concurrence], 2011, 3-2011 (37463)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754515

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