Endogenous preferences in games with Type-Indeterminate Players

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

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Abstract: The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding classical game.

Keywords: Type indeterminacy; Games; Endogeneous preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://pjse.hal.science/halshs-00754695v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in AAAI Press Menlo Park, 2010, FS 10-08, pp.70-77

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Working Paper: Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players (2010)
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