An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making

Jérôme Busemeyer and Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
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Jérôme Busemeyer: Indiana University - Indiana University [Bloomington] - Indiana University System

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Abstract: In this paper we explore an extension of the Type Indeterminacy model of decision-making to strategic decision-making. A 2×2 game is investigated. We first show that in a one-shot simultaneous move setting the TI-model is equivalent to the standard Bayes-Harsanyi model. We then let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise game. We show in an example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have an impact on the next following behavior when the standard Bayes-Harsanyi model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the intrinsic indeterminacy of the players' type.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Quantum Interaction, 2009, 5494, pp.113-128

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754784

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