Economics at your fingertips  

Inégalités face à la mort et systèmes de retraite

Nicolas Drouhin ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In a model of overlapping generation with uncertain lifetime, we show that "pay-as-you-go" social security implies transfers of wealth from the low life expectancy groups to the others. It also implies that the former may saturate their liquidity constraint, meaning loss of welfare for them. Separation of risks and introduction of fully founded social security improve the properties of "Pay-as-you-go" social security according to welfare and social justice.

Keywords: Social security; Lifetime uncertainty; Savings; Overlapping generations; Life cycle hypothesis; Redistribution.; Systèmes de retraite; Incertitude sur la durée de vie; Epargne; Générations imbriquées; Théorie du cycle de vie; Redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Published in Revue d'Economie Politique, Dalloz, 2001, 111, pp.116-126

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Inégalités face à la mort et systèmes de retraite (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

Page updated 2021-09-14
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00760957