The structure of unstable power mechanisms

Joseph Abdou

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Abstract: We study the structure of unstable power mechanisms. A power mechanism is modeled by an interaction form, the solution of which is called a settlement. By stability, we mean the existence of some settlement for any preference profile. Configurations that produce instability are called cycles. We introduce a stability index that measures the difficulty of emergence of cycles. Structural properties such as exactness, superadditivity, subadditivity and maximality provide indications about the type of instability that may affect the mechanism. We apply our analysis to strategic game forms in the context of Nash-like solutions or core-like solutions. In particular, we establish an upper bound on the stability index of maximal interaction forms.

Keywords: Interaction form; Effectivity function; Stability index; Nash equilibrium; Strong equilibrium; Solvability; Acyclicity; Nakamura number; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
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Published in Economic Theory, 2012, 50, pp.389 - 415

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Journal Article: The structure of unstable power mechanisms (2012)
Working Paper: The structure of unstable power mechanisms (2012)
Working Paper: The structure of unstable power mechanisms (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00762018

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