The Political Economy of Clientelism

James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier
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James A. Robinson: Harvard University

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Abstract: In this paper, we argue that the political-commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive-compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.

Keywords: Income redistribution; Political competition; Public policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (119)

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2013, 115 (2), pp.260-291

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Political Economy of Clientelism (2013)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Clientelism (2013)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Clientelism (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00846558

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