The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core

Vincent Iehlé

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Abstract: For any TU game and any ranking of players, the set of all preimputations compat- ible with the ranking, equipped with the Lorenz order, is a bounded join semi-lattice. Furthermore the set admits as sublattice the S-Lorenz core intersected with the region compatible with the ranking. This result uncovers a new property about the structure of the S-Lorenz core. As immediate corollaries we obtain complementary results to the findings of Dutta and Ray, Games Econ. Behav., 3(4) p. 403-422 (1991), by showing that any S-constrained egalitarian allocation is the (unique) Lorenz greatest element of the S-Lorenz core on the rank-preserving region the allocation belongs to. Besides, our results suggest that the comparison between W- and S-constrained egalitarian allocations is more puzzling than what is usually admitted in the literature.

Keywords: Lorenz criterion; Lorenz core; cooperative game; constrained egalitarian allocation; lattice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Published in Theory and Decision, 2015, 78 (1), pp.141-151. ⟨10.1007/s11238-014-9415-6⟩

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Journal Article: The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9415-6

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