A sharing mechanism for superadditive and non-superadditive logistics cooperation

Xiaozhou Xu (), Shenle Pan () and Eric Ballot ()
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Xiaozhou Xu: CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Shenle Pan: CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Eric Ballot: CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The lack of a stable, fair and generally applicable sharing mechanism is one of the most noticeable impediments to the implementation of logistics cooperation. Most of the current literature on the sharing mechanism in logistics cooperation focuses on superadditive logistics cooperation games, neglecting the probable occurrence of other types of games resulting from coordination cost and unequal partners. In this work, we propose a sharing model based on game theoretic solutions, taking account of the bargaining power of players to identify a fair in-Core allocation. Under full cooperation assumption, we generalize this model for non-superadditive logistics cooperation games with coordination costs at different levels. The games with empty Core are also studied within the model.

Keywords: Logistics cooperation; game-theoretical approach; bargaining power; non-superadditive game in logistics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00876006v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in International Conference on Industrial Engineering and System Management, Oct 2013, Rabat, Morocco

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