La responsabilité environnementale des prêteurs: difficultés juridiques et ensemble des possibles

Gerard Mondello

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Abstract: It is undeniable that the donors exert some environmental liability for the loans they grant to risky activities. However, the 1996 amendments to CERCLA have exempted lenders of much of their responsibility. This article shows that this situation tends to become perennial. This raises the question of the normativity of economic literature devoted to the liability of lenders. To bridge the gap between "practice" which exempts funders of liability and economic theory that takes it for granted, we propose to introduce a negligence rule for lenders who do not exert control on the operator's compliance with environmental rules. Then, the donors become effective "Principals" by determining the amount of effort the highest security possible by the operators (agents).

Keywords: strict liability; negligence rule; lenders; banks; banques; pollution; responsabilité subjective; prêteurs; responsabilité objective (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Published in Actualite Economique, 2012, 88 (2), pp.257-278. ⟨10.7202/1018431ar⟩

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Journal Article: La responsabilité environnementale des prêteurs: difficultés juridiques et ensemble des possibles (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00929853

DOI: 10.7202/1018431ar

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