R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers

Désiré Vencatachellum () and Bruno Versaevel
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Désiré Vencatachellum: HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal

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Keywords: Common Agency; externalities; research and development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, 2009, 9 (1), pp.art. 55

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Journal Article: R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers (2009)
Working Paper: R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00956711

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