Does fiscal coopération increase local tax rates in urban areas?
Sylvie Charlot,
Sonia Paty and
Virginie Piguet ()
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Virginie Piguet: CESAER - Centre d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales Appliquées à l'Agriculture et aux Espaces Ruraux - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroSup Dijon - Institut National Supérieur des Sciences Agronomiques, de l'Alimentation et de l'Environnement
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Abstract:
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation in a decentralized country using experience in French urban municipalities. A tax-setting model for local business tax is estimated, using spatial and panel econometric techniques, for the period 1993–2003. Controlling for population size, it is found that fiscal cooperation is likely to reduce tax competition and, as a consequence, to increase local business tax rates.
Keywords: local business tax; vertical externalities; tax competition; fiscal cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
Published in Regional Studies, 2015, 49 (10), pp. 1706-1721. ⟨10.1080/00343404.2013.878798⟩
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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Fiscal Cooperation Increase Local Tax Rates in Urban Areas? (2015) 
Working Paper: Does fiscal coopération increase local tax rates in urban areas? (2012) 
Working Paper: Does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas (2012) 
Working Paper: Does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas (2012)
Working Paper: Does fiscal coopération increase local tax rates in urban areas? (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00958049
DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2013.878798
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