Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Irem Bozbay, Franz Dietrich and Hans Peters

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Abstract: Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.

Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining; endogenous disagreement outcome; extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74, pp.407-417. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.007⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (2012)
Working Paper: Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00977992

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.007

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