Local interactions and p-best response set

Jacques Durieu () and Philippe Solal
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Jacques Durieu: CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2

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Abstract: We study a local interaction model where agents play a finite n-person game following a perturbed best-response process with inertia. We consider the concept of minimal p-best response set to analyze distributions of actions in the long run. We distinguish between two assumptions made by agents about the matching rule. We show that only actions contained in the minimal p-best response set can be selected provided p is sufficiently small. We demonstrate that these predictions are sensitive to the assumptions about the matching rule.

Keywords: model; game theory; modèle; théorie des jeux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01002448v1
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Published in Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014, vol. 2014, 7 p. ⟨10.1155/2014/415686⟩

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Journal Article: Local Interactions and p -Best Response Set (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01002448

DOI: 10.1155/2014/415686

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