Groupes bancaires coopératifs français: quel contrôle ?

Katia Lobre ()
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Katia Lobre: MAGELLAN - Laboratoire de Recherche Magellan - UJML - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3 - Université de Lyon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon

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Abstract: Due to their hybrid form, cooperative banks have an hard to defined legal status. The notion of cooperative member remains a relevant milestone regarding mutual banks values. The question is to assess if these members have a real power of control on all levels of these specific organizations? Our analysis demonstrates that the rise of auditing committees increases control capabilities of board administrators. Moreover, these committees lead to delay centralization process which is the cause of hybrid form.

Keywords: shareholder; autocontrol; corporate governance; hybridity; member; gouvernance; hybridité; sociétaire; actionnaire; audit; autocontrôle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Recherches en sciences de gestion, 2014, 101, pp.121-144. ⟨10.3917/resg.101.0121⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01059393

DOI: 10.3917/resg.101.0121

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