Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

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Abstract: The Banzhaf value is characterized on the (linear) space of all TU-games on a fixed player set by means of the Dummy player axiom and Strong transfer invariance. The latter axiom indicates that a player's payoff is invariant to a transfer of worth between two coalitions he or she belongs to. To prove this result we derive direct-sum decompositions of the space of all TU-games. This decomposition method has several advantages listed as concluding remarks.

Keywords: Banzhaf value; TU-games; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Published in Operations Research Letters, 2015, 43 (2), pp.123-125. ⟨10.1016/j.orl.2014.12.011⟩

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Working Paper: Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value (2014)
Working Paper: Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01097165

DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2014.12.011

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