Managerial incentives in mixed duopoly: the case of partial privatization

Incitations managériales dans un duopole mixte: cas de la privatisation partielle de la firme publique

Kadohognon Ouattara

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Abstract: This paper studies the impact of managerial incentive contracts in a game where a firm that is owned jointly by both the private and public sectors (a semi-public firm) competes with a private firm. The incentive scheme of semi-public firm managers is assumed to reflect the social goals of public authority. It was found that the strategic use of managerial incentive contracts can contribute to improve social welfare. Furthermore, the use of incentive contracts may have similar competitive effects than those of privatization.

Keywords: Mixed duopoly; managerial incentives; partial privatization; privatisation partielle; incitations managériales; Duopole mixte (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2013, 123 (4), pp.495-517. ⟨10.3917/redp.234.0495⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01101998

DOI: 10.3917/redp.234.0495

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