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Self-control, commitment and peer pressure:a laboratory experiment

Aurélie Bonein () and Laurent Denant-Boèmont

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Abstract: This paper focuses on the relationship between individual self-control and peer pressure. To this end, we performed a laboratory experiment that proceeded in two parts. The first part involved an individual real-effort task in which subjects could commit themselves to a particular level of performance while being tempted by an alternative recreational activity. The second part consisted of bargaining in a power-to-take game in which previously earned revenues were at stake. The experimental treatments involved variations in the available information provided to peers about previous individual behavior. The results show that many subjects make a serious commitment. Further, the subsequent revelation of commitment level induces subjects to increase the credible components of their commitment decisions. Past individual behaviors also play a role in bargaining because (i) partners who have committed themselves benefit from lower rates of both take and destruction and (ii) partners who have succumbed to temptation suffer from higher rates of both take and destruction.

Keywords: laboratory experiment; peer pressure; willpower; commitment; temptation; Self-control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Experimental Economics, 2015, 18 (4), pp.543-568. ⟨10.1007/s10683-014-9419-7⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01109987

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-014-9419-7

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