Coalitions d’acteurs et innovations managériales dans le secteur sanitaire, social et médico-social
Gulliver Lux (gulliver.lux@gmail.com) and
Nicolas Petit (nicolas.petit@mines-paristech.fr)
Additional contact information
Gulliver Lux: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IGR-IAE Rennes - Institut de Gestion de Rennes - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Rennes - UR - Université de Rennes
Nicolas Petit: IGR-IAE Rennes - Institut de Gestion de Rennes - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Rennes - UR - Université de Rennes
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Abstract:
This paper studies the behavior of a variety of stakeholders around the adoption of managerial innovations desired by operational managers of health services institutions. We show that if the operational manager may cause the managerial innovation, the tool prospective is subject to power games around coalitions of actors. The study of several management situations in health services institutions enables us, using the game theory, to highlight the "winning, "losing" and "uncertain" coalitions that can achieve operational management within the establishment to settle a managerial innovation.
Keywords: Innovation managériale; théorie des jeux; jeux de pouvoir; coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-01
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Published in PUR. Le pilotage des services publics, pp.105-132, 2015, 978-2-7535-3714-9
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01112059
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