The Winner's Curse in Sports Economics

Wladimir Andreff ()
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Wladimir Andreff: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The winner's curse occurs in four situations in the sports economy. When bidding to host a mega-sporting event, the winner's curse reveals in cost overruns. When bidding to attract a sport franchise, it appears that the host city is not worth off. When television channels bid to acquire broadcasting rights over a sport event, they pay more than its value. When teams are overbidding to recruit free agent and superstar players, they happen to end up in the red. Indices are suggested to verify the existence of a winner's curse in the four cases.

Keywords: Winner's curse concession; Winner's curse; auctions; sports economics; mega-sporting events; cost overruns; sport franchise; broascasting rights; superstars (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Published in Oliver Budzinski and Arne Feddersen. Contemporary Research in Sports Economics, Political Economics, Competition and Regulation (14), Peter Lang Academic Research, pp.179-205, 2014, 978-3-631-64657-1

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01117785

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